Global Ring of Trust — Threat Model
Purpose and scope
This threat model covers a proposed developer identity, provenance, and evidence-exchange framework. It is not a threat model for the operating-system kernel and does not grant authorization to access systems. The current OS-level-support implementation remains user-mode and must rely on the host OS for access control.
Assets to protect
- integrity and authenticity of developer, project, release, and build-provenance claims;
- availability and discoverability of revocation and security advisories;
- confidentiality of personal information and non-public incident details;
- independence and integrity of review, governance, and transparency records;
- user understanding of what a trust statement does—and does not—assert.
Threat actors and failure cases
- attacker steals or misuses a developer/release signing key;
- malicious or compromised maintainer publishes a harmful artifact under a legitimate project identity;
- compromised CI/build infrastructure produces an artifact inconsistent with reviewed source;
- fraudulent, coerced, or mistaken identity verification;
- colluding or compromised reviewers, auditors, root operators, or transparency services;
- forged, replayed, expired, or incorrectly scoped statements;
- revocation delay, split views, service outage, or denial of evidence access;
- supply-chain substitution between source, build, distribution, and installation;
- overbroad interpretation of a “trusted” label as permission to execute or elevate;
- privacy leakage through identity, logs, build metadata, or incident records.
Mitigations required before deployment
- scoped, short-lived credentials; hardware-backed key protection where practical; multi-party approval for high-impact release keys; documented rotation and compromise response;
- signed release manifests that bind exact artifact digests to source revision, build identity, toolchain, and platform; independent verification and reproducible-build evidence where feasible;
- append-only transparency records with independent monitors and a documented split-view response;
- explicit expiry, anti-replay context, policy version, revocation endpoint, and defined behavior during verification-service outages;
- independent reviewers with disclosed scope, conflicts, limitations, and appeal route; no self-issued assurance presented as independent review;
- data minimization, retention limits, redaction, access controls, and a process for correcting inaccurate identity records;
- user interfaces that distinguish identity verification, artifact integrity, review status, runtime authorization, and software safety;
- no automatic execution, privilege change, trust-root installation, or access-control bypass as a result of a trust statement.
Residual risk
Signatures and provenance cannot prove software is benign, bug-free, non-malicious, or suitable for a particular system. A correctly signed release can still contain vulnerabilities or intentionally harmful behavior. Users and administrators must retain independent control over installation and execution decisions.
Safe implementation boundary
This repository may add parsers and validators for public trust statements that are bounded, deterministic, and non-authorizing. Such code must reject malformed input, avoid loading keys or contacting networks implicitly, and return explicit verification states. It must not install trust roots, execute a subject artifact, invoke privileged APIs, or treat a validated identity statement as an OS capability.