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THREAT-MODEL.md

os-level-support/trust/THREAT-MODEL.md · 46 line(s) · markdown

Global Ring of Trust — Threat Model

Purpose and scope

This threat model covers a proposed developer identity, provenance, and evidence-exchange framework. It is not a threat model for the operating-system kernel and does not grant authorization to access systems. The current OS-level-support implementation remains user-mode and must rely on the host OS for access control.

Assets to protect

Threat actors and failure cases

Mitigations required before deployment

Residual risk

Signatures and provenance cannot prove software is benign, bug-free, non-malicious, or suitable for a particular system. A correctly signed release can still contain vulnerabilities or intentionally harmful behavior. Users and administrators must retain independent control over installation and execution decisions.

Safe implementation boundary

This repository may add parsers and validators for public trust statements that are bounded, deterministic, and non-authorizing. Such code must reject malformed input, avoid loading keys or contacting networks implicitly, and return explicit verification states. It must not install trust roots, execute a subject artifact, invoke privileged APIs, or treat a validated identity statement as an OS capability.