# Global Ring of Trust — Threat Model ## Purpose and scope This threat model covers a proposed developer identity, provenance, and evidence-exchange framework. It is not a threat model for the operating-system kernel and does not grant authorization to access systems. The current OS-level-support implementation remains user-mode and must rely on the host OS for access control. ## Assets to protect - integrity and authenticity of developer, project, release, and build-provenance claims; - availability and discoverability of revocation and security advisories; - confidentiality of personal information and non-public incident details; - independence and integrity of review, governance, and transparency records; - user understanding of what a trust statement does—and does not—assert. ## Threat actors and failure cases - attacker steals or misuses a developer/release signing key; - malicious or compromised maintainer publishes a harmful artifact under a legitimate project identity; - compromised CI/build infrastructure produces an artifact inconsistent with reviewed source; - fraudulent, coerced, or mistaken identity verification; - colluding or compromised reviewers, auditors, root operators, or transparency services; - forged, replayed, expired, or incorrectly scoped statements; - revocation delay, split views, service outage, or denial of evidence access; - supply-chain substitution between source, build, distribution, and installation; - overbroad interpretation of a “trusted” label as permission to execute or elevate; - privacy leakage through identity, logs, build metadata, or incident records. ## Mitigations required before deployment - scoped, short-lived credentials; hardware-backed key protection where practical; multi-party approval for high-impact release keys; documented rotation and compromise response; - signed release manifests that bind exact artifact digests to source revision, build identity, toolchain, and platform; independent verification and reproducible-build evidence where feasible; - append-only transparency records with independent monitors and a documented split-view response; - explicit expiry, anti-replay context, policy version, revocation endpoint, and defined behavior during verification-service outages; - independent reviewers with disclosed scope, conflicts, limitations, and appeal route; no self-issued assurance presented as independent review; - data minimization, retention limits, redaction, access controls, and a process for correcting inaccurate identity records; - user interfaces that distinguish identity verification, artifact integrity, review status, runtime authorization, and software safety; - no automatic execution, privilege change, trust-root installation, or access-control bypass as a result of a trust statement. ## Residual risk Signatures and provenance cannot prove software is benign, bug-free, non-malicious, or suitable for a particular system. A correctly signed release can still contain vulnerabilities or intentionally harmful behavior. Users and administrators must retain independent control over installation and execution decisions. ## Safe implementation boundary This repository may add parsers and validators for public trust statements that are bounded, deterministic, and non-authorizing. Such code must reject malformed input, avoid loading keys or contacting networks implicitly, and return explicit verification states. It must not install trust roots, execute a subject artifact, invoke privileged APIs, or treat a validated identity statement as an OS capability.