SLNashBargaining.sleela
lib/advantage/math/SLNashBargaining.sleela · 122 line(s) · sleela
<< lib/advantage/math/SLNashBargaining.sleela
SLeeLa Standard Library Definition.
Definition: Bilateral monopoly & Nash bargaining -- split a known joint
surplus by a bargaining-power index over reservation profits. >>
#sleela 3.0
material;
artifact;
pure;
gasoline;
< Model 2 of the advantage trade subject. Once the joint surplus is fixed at >
< Q*, the SPLIT depends on the wholesale price P. Individual profit curves: >
< Seller: Pi_S(P,Q) = P*Q - C_S(Q) >
< Buyer: Pi_B(P,Q) = R_B(Q) - P*Q >
< The Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash 1950) picks the price that maximizes the >
< geometric product of each party's surplus over its disagreement point: >
< max_P [Pi_S - Pi_S0]^alpha * [Pi_B - Pi_B0]^(1-alpha). >
< alpha in [0,1] is the bargaining-power index; alpha=0.5 splits the surplus >
< evenly. Depends on a SLJointProfitMax for the curves and SLTradeMath for the >
< fractional-exponent power (both sibling-linked within advantage/math). >
class SLNashBargaining {
< ---- Descriptive metadata (version 1.11 nested-friendly accessors) ---- >
<< Eleven catalogued attributes with getter/setter pairs, so a GUI, loader,
or catalog can read and (where appropriate) override this record.
Values are faithful to the subject's real origin where publicly known. >>
String metaVersion = "1.0.0";
int metaId = 10523;
String metaAuthor = "Kiro Agent";
String metaDate = "2026-11-08";
String metaCopyright = "SLeeLa project";
String metaTrademark = "none";
String metaCorporation = "none";
< metaOrigin: National | <nation> | International | Galactic >
String metaOrigin = "International";
String metaBirthDate = "2026-11-08";
< metaScienceRating: maturity/robustness on a 1..10 scale >
int metaScienceRating = 8;
<< metaNationalSchedule: the Nash Bargaining Solution is J. F. Nash,
"The Bargaining Problem", Econometrica 18(2):155-162 (1950); an academic
result, not a statute. >>
String metaNationalSchedule = "none";
String getMetaVersion() { return metaVersion; }
void setMetaVersion(String v) { metaVersion = v; }
int getMetaId() { return metaId; }
void setMetaId(int v) { metaId = v; }
String getAuthor() { return metaAuthor; }
void setAuthor(String v) { metaAuthor = v; }
String getDate() { return metaDate; }
void setDate(String v) { metaDate = v; }
String getCopyright() { return metaCopyright; }
void setCopyright(String v) { metaCopyright = v; }
String getTrademark() { return metaTrademark; }
void setTrademark(String v) { metaTrademark = v; }
String getCorporation() { return metaCorporation; }
void setCorporation(String v) { metaCorporation = v; }
String getOrigin() { return metaOrigin; }
void setOrigin(String v) { metaOrigin = v; }
String getBirthDate() { return metaBirthDate; }
void setBirthDate(String v) { metaBirthDate = v; }
int getScienceRating() { return metaScienceRating; }
void setScienceRating(int v) { metaScienceRating = v; }
String getNationalSchedule() { return metaNationalSchedule; }
void setNationalSchedule(String v) { metaNationalSchedule = v; }
< ---- Dependencies (sibling-linked within advantage/math) ---- >
SLJointProfitMax curves;
SLTradeMath mathlib;
void configure(SLJointProfitMax c) {
curves = c;
mathlib = new SLTradeMath();
}
< Seller profit at wholesale price P and quantity Q: (P*Q) - C_S(Q). >
double sellerProfit(double price, double q) {
return price * q - curves.sellerCost(q);
}
< Buyer profit at wholesale price P and quantity Q: R_B(Q) - (P*Q). >
double buyerProfit(double price, double q) {
return curves.buyerRevenue(q) - price * q;
}
< The Nash objective at a candidate price. Both surpluses must be positive >
< to be inside the bargaining range; outside it the objective is 0. >
double nashObjective(double price, double q, double s0, double b0, double alpha) {
double ss = sellerProfit(price, q) - s0;
double bs = buyerProfit(price, q) - b0;
if (ss <= 0.0) { return 0.0; }
if (bs <= 0.0) { return 0.0; }
return mathlib.powAB(ss, alpha) * mathlib.powAB(bs, 1.0 - alpha);
}
<< Closed-form Nash price at the optimal quantity. Total profit is fixed at
Q*, so moving P only transfers value (d Pi_S/dP = +Q*). The generalized
Nash solution awards the seller a fraction alpha of the bargainable
surplus S = Pi_total(Q*) - Pi_S0 - Pi_B0:
Pi_S(P*) - Pi_S0 = alpha * S, Pi_S(P*) = P*Q* - C_S(Q*)
=> P* = ( Pi_S0 + alpha*S + C_S(Q*) ) / Q*. >>
double nashPrice(double s0, double b0, double alpha) {
double q = curves.optimalQuantity();
if (q <= 0.0) { return 0.0; }
double total = curves.jointProfit(q);
double surplus = total - s0 - b0;
double sellerShare = s0 + alpha * surplus;
return (sellerShare + curves.sellerCost(q)) / q;
}
< The joint surplus available for bargaining beyond both reservation points. >
double bargainableSurplus(double s0, double b0) {
return curves.maxJointProfit() - s0 - b0;
}
String describe(double s0, double b0, double alpha) {
double q = curves.optimalQuantity();
double p = nashPrice(s0, b0, alpha);
return "NashBargaining: alpha=" + alpha + " P*=" + p
+ " sellerProfit=" + sellerProfit(p, q)
+ " buyerProfit=" + buyerProfit(p, q);
}
}