<< lib/advantage/math/SLNashBargaining.sleela SLeeLa Standard Library Definition. Definition: Bilateral monopoly & Nash bargaining -- split a known joint surplus by a bargaining-power index over reservation profits. >> #sleela 3.0 material; artifact; pure; gasoline; < Model 2 of the advantage trade subject. Once the joint surplus is fixed at > < Q*, the SPLIT depends on the wholesale price P. Individual profit curves: > < Seller: Pi_S(P,Q) = P*Q - C_S(Q) > < Buyer: Pi_B(P,Q) = R_B(Q) - P*Q > < The Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash 1950) picks the price that maximizes the > < geometric product of each party's surplus over its disagreement point: > < max_P [Pi_S - Pi_S0]^alpha * [Pi_B - Pi_B0]^(1-alpha). > < alpha in [0,1] is the bargaining-power index; alpha=0.5 splits the surplus > < evenly. Depends on a SLJointProfitMax for the curves and SLTradeMath for the > < fractional-exponent power (both sibling-linked within advantage/math). > class SLNashBargaining { < ---- Descriptive metadata (version 1.11 nested-friendly accessors) ---- > << Eleven catalogued attributes with getter/setter pairs, so a GUI, loader, or catalog can read and (where appropriate) override this record. Values are faithful to the subject's real origin where publicly known. >> String metaVersion = "1.0.0"; int metaId = 10523; String metaAuthor = "Kiro Agent"; String metaDate = "2026-11-08"; String metaCopyright = "SLeeLa project"; String metaTrademark = "none"; String metaCorporation = "none"; < metaOrigin: National | | International | Galactic > String metaOrigin = "International"; String metaBirthDate = "2026-11-08"; < metaScienceRating: maturity/robustness on a 1..10 scale > int metaScienceRating = 8; << metaNationalSchedule: the Nash Bargaining Solution is J. F. Nash, "The Bargaining Problem", Econometrica 18(2):155-162 (1950); an academic result, not a statute. >> String metaNationalSchedule = "none"; String getMetaVersion() { return metaVersion; } void setMetaVersion(String v) { metaVersion = v; } int getMetaId() { return metaId; } void setMetaId(int v) { metaId = v; } String getAuthor() { return metaAuthor; } void setAuthor(String v) { metaAuthor = v; } String getDate() { return metaDate; } void setDate(String v) { metaDate = v; } String getCopyright() { return metaCopyright; } void setCopyright(String v) { metaCopyright = v; } String getTrademark() { return metaTrademark; } void setTrademark(String v) { metaTrademark = v; } String getCorporation() { return metaCorporation; } void setCorporation(String v) { metaCorporation = v; } String getOrigin() { return metaOrigin; } void setOrigin(String v) { metaOrigin = v; } String getBirthDate() { return metaBirthDate; } void setBirthDate(String v) { metaBirthDate = v; } int getScienceRating() { return metaScienceRating; } void setScienceRating(int v) { metaScienceRating = v; } String getNationalSchedule() { return metaNationalSchedule; } void setNationalSchedule(String v) { metaNationalSchedule = v; } < ---- Dependencies (sibling-linked within advantage/math) ---- > SLJointProfitMax curves; SLTradeMath mathlib; void configure(SLJointProfitMax c) { curves = c; mathlib = new SLTradeMath(); } < Seller profit at wholesale price P and quantity Q: (P*Q) - C_S(Q). > double sellerProfit(double price, double q) { return price * q - curves.sellerCost(q); } < Buyer profit at wholesale price P and quantity Q: R_B(Q) - (P*Q). > double buyerProfit(double price, double q) { return curves.buyerRevenue(q) - price * q; } < The Nash objective at a candidate price. Both surpluses must be positive > < to be inside the bargaining range; outside it the objective is 0. > double nashObjective(double price, double q, double s0, double b0, double alpha) { double ss = sellerProfit(price, q) - s0; double bs = buyerProfit(price, q) - b0; if (ss <= 0.0) { return 0.0; } if (bs <= 0.0) { return 0.0; } return mathlib.powAB(ss, alpha) * mathlib.powAB(bs, 1.0 - alpha); } << Closed-form Nash price at the optimal quantity. Total profit is fixed at Q*, so moving P only transfers value (d Pi_S/dP = +Q*). The generalized Nash solution awards the seller a fraction alpha of the bargainable surplus S = Pi_total(Q*) - Pi_S0 - Pi_B0: Pi_S(P*) - Pi_S0 = alpha * S, Pi_S(P*) = P*Q* - C_S(Q*) => P* = ( Pi_S0 + alpha*S + C_S(Q*) ) / Q*. >> double nashPrice(double s0, double b0, double alpha) { double q = curves.optimalQuantity(); if (q <= 0.0) { return 0.0; } double total = curves.jointProfit(q); double surplus = total - s0 - b0; double sellerShare = s0 + alpha * surplus; return (sellerShare + curves.sellerCost(q)) / q; } < The joint surplus available for bargaining beyond both reservation points. > double bargainableSurplus(double s0, double b0) { return curves.maxJointProfit() - s0 - b0; } String describe(double s0, double b0, double alpha) { double q = curves.optimalQuantity(); double p = nashPrice(s0, b0, alpha); return "NashBargaining: alpha=" + alpha + " P*=" + p + " sellerProfit=" + sellerProfit(p, q) + " buyerProfit=" + buyerProfit(p, q); } }