#!/bin/sh # web-server-technology/native/hardening-live-test.sh # # End-to-end test of the Section-3 hardening features against the live server: # - per-peer rate limiting returns 503 past the cap, recovers after the window; # - write-token: a mutating /db statement is 401 without the bearer token and # succeeds with it; # - status reports the hardening flags. set -e HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" BIN="$HERE/build/sleela-web-server" SQL="$HERE/../../lib/sleela-sql/build/sleela-sql" PORT="${PORT:-8094}" WORK="$(mktemp -d)" LOG="$(mktemp)" cleanup() { [ -n "$PID" ] && kill "$PID" 2>/dev/null || true; rm -rf "$WORK" "$LOG"; } trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM mkdir -p "$WORK/root" "$WORK/db" printf 'ok\n' > "$WORK/root/ping.txt" "$SQL" "$WORK/db" "CREATE TABLE t (id, v)" >/dev/null "$SQL" "$WORK/db" "INSERT INTO t VALUES (1, 'a')" >/dev/null echo "=== A) rate limit: 3 req / 1000ms per peer, 4th is 503 ===" "$BIN" --port "$PORT" --root "$WORK/root" --db "$WORK/db" \ --rate-per-peer 3 --rate-window-ms 1000 >"$LOG" 2>&1 & PID=$!; sleep 1 for n in 1 2 3 4; do code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/ping.txt") echo "request $n -> HTTP $code" done echo "waiting out the window (1.1s)..."; sleep 1.1 code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/ping.txt") echo "after window -> HTTP $code" echo "status: $(curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/__sleela/status")" kill "$PID" 2>/dev/null || true; wait "$PID" 2>/dev/null || true; PID= echo "" echo "=== B) write-token: mutation needs Authorization: Bearer ===" "$BIN" --port "$PORT" --root "$WORK/root" --db "$WORK/db" --db-writable \ --write-token "topsecret" >"$LOG" 2>&1 & PID=$!; sleep 1 echo -n "1) read without token (allowed): " curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/db/query?sql=SELECT%20v%20FROM%20t" echo -n "2) write WITHOUT token (401): " curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'HTTP %{http_code}\n' -X POST --data "INSERT INTO t VALUES (2, 'b')" "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/db/query" echo -n "3) write with WRONG token (401): " curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'HTTP %{http_code}\n' -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer nope" --data "INSERT INTO t VALUES (2, 'b')" "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/db/query" echo -n "4) write with correct token (ok): " curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer topsecret" --data "INSERT INTO t VALUES (2, 'b')" "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/db/query" echo -n "5) confirm the row landed: " curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/db/query?sql=SELECT%20COUNT(*)%20FROM%20t" echo "=== server log (B) ===" grep -E 'write-unauthorized|write-denied|db-query ok|status=401' "$LOG" | tail -6 kill "$PID" 2>/dev/null || true; wait "$PID" 2>/dev/null || true; PID= echo "" echo "=== C) trusted-proxy: client IP from a TLS terminator, with anti-spoofing ===" # Trust 127.0.0.1 as the terminator. Rate-limit per peer = 1 so we can observe # which client identity the limiter is keyed on. "$BIN" --port "$PORT" --root "$WORK/root" \ --trusted-proxy 127.0.0.1 --rate-per-peer 1 --rate-window-ms 5000 >"$LOG" 2>&1 & PID=$!; sleep 1 # First request as forwarded client 9.9.9.9 (allowed; keys the limiter on 9.9.9.9). echo "req A (XFF 9.9.9.9) -> $(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 9.9.9.9' "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/ping.txt")" # Second request as a DIFFERENT forwarded client 8.8.8.8 is a different identity # -> allowed (proves the limiter keys on the forwarded client, not the peer). echo "req B (XFF 8.8.8.8) -> $(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8' "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/ping.txt")" # Repeat client 9.9.9.9 -> now over its per-peer cap -> 503. echo "req C (XFF 9.9.9.9 again) -> $(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 9.9.9.9' "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/ping.txt")" echo "client identities seen in log:" grep -oE 'client=[0-9.]+' "$LOG" | sort | uniq -c