# Production hardening (Section 3) The dynamic web server ships four in-process hardening controls plus a documented TLS boundary. All are off/open by default (so Side-1 and Side-2 behaviour is unchanged) and configurable both as **startup flags** and in the **configuration file**; the command line overrides the file. ## 1. Rate limiting (admission control) A sliding-window limiter beyond the connection-queue back-pressure. Two independent windows: - **per-peer**: at most N requests per window per client IP; - **global**: at most N requests per window across all peers. A limit of `0` disables that dimension. Over-limit requests get `503` with `Connection: close` and are **not** counted (a flood does not keep the window pinned full). Aged-out per-peer windows are swept periodically to bound memory. ```sh --rate-per-peer N # per-client cap (0 = off) --rate-global N # global cap (0 = off) --rate-window-ms N # window, default 1000 ``` ```text # or in the config file: rate-per-peer = 60 rate-global = 5000 rate-window-ms = 1000 ``` ## 2. Write authorization (bearer token) When a token is set, a **mutating** `/db` statement must present `Authorization: Bearer `. Reads are unaffected. The comparison is **constant time** over the longer of the two strings, so a token is not leaked by response timing. A missing/incorrect token yields `401`. ```sh --write-token TOKEN ``` ```text write-token = s3cr3t ``` This composes with `--db-writable`: writes require **both** that mutations are permitted at all *and* a valid token. ## 3. Trusted-proxy client identity (for a TLS terminator) When the server runs behind a reverse proxy that terminates TLS, the immediate TCP peer is the proxy, not the client. Listing the proxy as trusted makes the server honour the proxy's `Forwarded` / `X-Forwarded-For` header to recover the real client IP (used for rate-limiting and logging). A `Forwarded` header from a peer that is **not** an allowlisted proxy is ignored, so clients cannot spoof their address. ```sh --trusted-proxy 127.0.0.1 # repeatable ``` ```text trusted-proxy = 127.0.0.1 trusted-proxy = 10.0.0.1 ``` The left-most entry of an `X-Forwarded-For` list is taken as the originating client (what the trusted terminator recorded first). ## 4. TLS 1.3 — deployment model The server does **not** terminate TLS in-process. Hand-rolling a TLS stack would be the wrong call for a server that aims to be honest about its security posture. Instead, terminate TLS at a dedicated, well-audited front end and run this server as the trusted upstream: ``` Internet ──TLS 1.3──> reverse proxy (nginx / Caddy / Envoy) ──HTTP──> sleela-web-server │ terminates TLS, sets X-Forwarded-For │ --trusted-proxy │ (and ideally Forwarded) │ --rate-per-peer / --write-token ``` Minimal nginx example: ```nginx server { listen 443 ssl http2; server_name science.example; ssl_certificate /etc/ssl/science.example.crt; ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/science.example.key; ssl_protocols TLSv1.3; location / { proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8090; proxy_set_header Host $host; proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr; proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme; } } ``` Then start the server trusting the terminator: ```sh sleela-web-server --port 8090 --addr 127.0.0.1 \ --root ./public --db ./data --db-writable \ --trusted-proxy 127.0.0.1 --rate-per-peer 60 --write-token "$WRITE_TOKEN" ``` Binding the server to `127.0.0.1` (or a private interface) ensures it is only reachable through the terminator. The server's dual-stack world-IP reach is then provided at the TLS edge, which is where it belongs for a public deployment. For HTTP/3, the repository's Grade-3 server already delegates QUIC/TLS to an external backend (`http-servers/3`); the same reverse-proxy pattern applies. ## Status and logging `/__sleela/status` reports `rate_limit`, `write_auth`, and `trusted_proxies`. Every request log line now carries `client=` (the effective client, after trusted-proxy resolution). Query strings, bodies, and tokens are never logged. ## Still outstanding (tracked, not delivered) - The `lib/sleela-sql` engine's own ROADMAP items — ACID transactions, concurrent-writer isolation, JOINs/richer predicates — remain a separate effort and are *not* claimed here. - CI wiring and large-scale stress/fuzz tests. - Real IPv6 validation on a dual-stack host (only IPv4 was exercisable in the build environment). ## Tests - `native/hardening-test.cpp` — unit tests for the limiter, constant-time compare, bearer-token parse, and trusted-proxy resolution (`make check`). - `native/hardening-live-test.sh` — end-to-end rate limit, write-token, and trusted-proxy anti-spoofing against the running server. - `native/config-hardening-test.sh` — the same features configured from a file.