SLeeLa Source Voting Annotation — Manual Democratic Governance
Status: proposed declarative syntax for Syntax 3.0 source documents. The @vote block below is ordinary SLeeLa documentation-comment content. It is inert: the current compiler does not parse it, collect ballots, determine eligibility, or produce a legally binding election result. A future governance tool may validate and manage it without changing program execution.
1. Design goals
A vote defined in a SLeeLa source document must be tied to an exact source revision and a clearly stated proposal; limited to an expressly named, independently defined electorate; open and closed at explicit UTC times; governed by a declared counting rule, quorum, and treatment of abstentions; suitable for paper/manual ballots and a separately maintained eligibility register; auditable without publishing secret ballots or exposing voter identities; certified by independent tellers; and distinguishable from ordinary code comments, runtime instructions, and legal elections.
The annotation records how a human decision is to be conducted. It is not itself a vote and never authorizes code execution, deployment, spending, or policy changes.
2. Proposed source syntax
Use a documentation comment with the sentinel @vote. Since the enclosing << ... >> block is already comment syntax, older compilers ignore the entire declaration safely.
#sleela 3.0 << @vote id: "registry-record-model-2026-01" title: "Adopt the Registry 3.0 record model" proposal: "Approve the versioned identity and relationship record model." source: "registry/REGISTRY-3.0-ARCHITECTURE.md" source_digest: "sha256:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef" electorate: "RegistryMaintainers" eligibility_rule: "registry-maintainer-v1" opens_utc: "2026-11-05T15:00:00Z" closes_utc: "2026-11-12T21:00:00Z" ballot: "manual-paper" secrecy: "secret" options: "approve,reject,abstain" counting_rule: "strict-majority" quorum_min_ballots: 5 quorum_min_participation_percent: 50 abstain_counts_for_quorum: true abstain_in_approval_denominator: false tie_result: "not-adopted" invalid_ballot: "exclude-and-record-count" tellers_required: 2 challenge_hours: 72 result_publication: "aggregate-only" >> material; class RegistryRecordModelProposal { String proposalId = "registry-record-model-2026-01"; String sourceDigest = "sha256:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"; }
The digest above is an illustrative placeholder, not a real digest. Before opening a ballot, replace it with the SHA-256 digest of the exact frozen proposal source. The source path is a locator; the digest plus source revision identifies the text that voters considered.
3. Annotation fields
| Field | Required meaning |
|---|---|
| id | Unique proposal/vote identifier in the governance namespace. Never reused. |
| title, proposal | Human-readable title and exact question/decision proposed. |
| source | Repository-relative path or stable URI to the complete proposal text. |
| source_digest | SHA-256 of the frozen proposal bytes, with declared encoding/newline convention. |
| electorate | Named group or roster reference; never inferred from repository access. |
| eligibility_rule | Versioned policy describing admission to the electorate and the record date. |
| opens_utc, closes_utc | Explicit UTC window; close instant is exclusive. |
| ballot | manual-paper for hand-marked and manually counted ballots. |
| secrecy | secret or open. No default. |
| options | Exact allowed choices. The base profile is approve/reject/abstain. |
| counting_rule | strict-majority or declared supermajority such as two-thirds. |
| quorum_min_ballots | Minimum valid ballots required, including abstentions when configured. |
| quorum_min_participation_percent | Optional minimum valid-ballot participation percentage of the frozen eligible electorate. |
| abstain_counts_for_quorum | Whether abstentions count toward participation quorum. |
| abstain_in_approval_denominator | Whether abstentions enter the approve/reject denominator. Recommended false. |
| tie_result | Required tie outcome; baseline is not-adopted. |
| invalid_ballot | Handling of invalid, duplicate, late, or spoiled submissions. |
| tellers_required | Minimum independent tellers; secret manual ballots require at least two. |
| challenge_hours | Time to challenge procedure or arithmetic after preliminary publication. |
| result_publication | aggregate-only for secret voting; no voter-to-choice mapping is public. |
A parser must reject missing mandatory fields, duplicate fields, unknown counting rules, invalid percentages, malformed timestamps, a missing source digest, or a close time not later than the open time. It must not invent defaults for electorate, ballot secrecy, quorum, or threshold.
4. Manual secret-ballot procedure
- Freeze the proposal. Publish the exact source revision, digest, proposal question, voter eligibility policy, and voting window. Any substantive amendment creates a new proposal ID and restarts the vote.
- Freeze the electorate. A designated eligibility custodian produces a dated roster before opening. Record the roster digest and eligible count. Repository read access, commit access, or authorship alone does not establish eligibility.
- Issue one ballot per eligible participant. The custodian marks participation on a separate roster. For secret voting, do not put a person's name, account, signature, or roster identifier on the ballot. Mix submitted paper ballots before counting. Do not create a public mapping between voter and ballot.
- Secure custody. Two custodians witness ballot-box sealing, opening, transfer, and count. Record issued, returned, spoiled, late, and invalid ballot totals separately.
- Count independently. Two tellers count the same set independently. Reconcile discrepancies before certifying; retain a signed count sheet and non-identifying ballot-handling log.
- Publish the result. Publish electorate size, valid participation, approve, reject, abstain, invalid, quorum result, threshold, arithmetic, source digest, teller attestations, and challenge deadline. For secret votes, publish aggregates only.
- Challenge and certify. Challenges identify a procedural or arithmetic issue and are resolved under the stated governance policy. Record the final certificate, dissent, and unresolved qualifications. A challenge does not reveal secret ballots.
- Record the outcome. Registry may catalog the proposal, aggregate tally, source digest, and certification reference. A successful vote is a governance decision only within the authority of the named organization and its rules; it is not general legal authorization.
5. Counting rules
Let E be the eligible participants in the frozen roster; A the valid approve ballots; R the valid reject ballots; B the valid abstain ballots; V the valid ballots counted for quorum (A + R + B when abstentions count for quorum); Q the required quorum; and D the approval denominator (A + R when abstentions are excluded).
Quorum is met only when V is at least Q. If quorum fails, the result is no decision. If D is zero, the result is no decision even when the participation quorum is met.
- Strict majority: adopt only when A is greater than R. A tie is not adopted.
- Two-thirds: adopt only when A is at least the ceiling of two times D divided by three.
- Abstentions are reported and count toward participation only when configured. They are not silently counted as approval or rejection.
No outcome is inferred from a raw percentage without reporting quorum, actual counts, denominator, and method.
6. Open ballots
For secrecy: open, the organization may publish voter identities and choices only when its eligibility policy and participants' notice explicitly permit disclosure. The default privacy posture should be secret. Never switch a vote from secret to open after it begins.
7. Registry integration model
A future governance adapter may create:
- governance.proposal — frozen proposal identity, source digest, electorate reference, rule, and dates;
- governance.ballot-session — opening/closing event, custody references, and participation totals;
- governance.tally — aggregate counts, quorum calculation, method, teller attestations, challenge result, and certification state.
For a secret ballot, individual choices belong in controlled custody records; public Registry stores only aggregate results and non-identifying audit references. The eligibility roster is not published as source code. No Registry register, verify, or resolve command should reveal secret choices or convert a tally into an executable command.
8. Implementation boundary
This document specifies a human-readable source annotation and manual process. It is not yet a compiler grammar extension, CLI ballot collector, cryptographic voting protocol, voter-authentication system, or election service. Those require a separate implementation, threat model, accessibility review, privacy policy, and test suite. The syntax is intentionally declarative and non-executable until those pieces are separately approved and built.
The process is for voluntary project or organizational governance. It does not claim to satisfy statutes or election-administration requirements for public elections.