Global Ring of Trust — Evidence and Conformance Checklist
This checklist is a proposal for future implementers. It does not certify this repository or any OS developer.
A. Claim clarity
- [ ] Every claim has a named subject, issuer, type, scope, issue time, expiry, and policy version.
- [ ] Project identity, maintainer identity, source revision, artifact digest, build provenance, and independent assessment are represented separately.
- [ ] Claims state evidence, assurance level, limitations, and the method used to verify identity.
- [ ] “Trusted” is never used without explaining what was checked and when.
B. Release integrity
- [ ] Release digests are computed with a current, explicitly named cryptographic hash.
- [ ] A signature is bound to the exact manifest bytes and a declared signing-key identifier.
- [ ] Key lifecycle documentation covers custody, access control, rotation, revocation, and compromise response.
- [ ] Build provenance identifies source revision, builder identity, toolchain, build parameters, and output digest.
- [ ] Reproducibility results and exceptions are published with their exact scope.
C. Governance and review
- [ ] Root and policy governance is plural, transparent, and has documented quorum and change history.
- [ ] Reviewers disclose conflicts and publish assessment scope and limitations.
- [ ] Membership suspension, removal, correction, and appeal have documented procedures.
- [ ] Revocations are timestamped, publicly discoverable, and monitored for propagation.
- [ ] No member or trust-root operator can grant OS-level privilege through membership.
D. Privacy and accessibility
- [ ] Personal data collection is minimized and retention is specified.
- [ ] Public evidence is redacted where disclosure is unnecessary for verification.
- [ ] Users can understand the difference between identity, provenance, assessment, and runtime permission.
- [ ] Verification failures, unknown status, and service outages are displayed distinctly.
E. OS-level-support implementation gate
Before adding any trust-statement code to the C/C++ library:
- [ ] Choose a published, interoperable data format and supported signature profiles; do not invent cryptography.
- [ ] Define canonicalization and exact signed bytes; reject ambiguous encodings and duplicate fields.
- [ ] Add size, depth, and resource limits for untrusted input.
- [ ] Separate parsing, cryptographic signature checking, identity binding, revocation lookup, and policy evaluation into distinct result states.
- [ ] Make network access, if ever required, explicit and caller-controlled.
- [ ] Do not download/install trust roots automatically.
- [ ] Do not execute code, load drivers, install hooks, change system settings, or elevate privileges based on a validated statement.
- [ ] Test malformed inputs, truncation, expiry, revocation, key rotation, wrong scope, replay, and platform-independent behavior.
- [ ] Obtain independent security review before using the result to influence software distribution or execution decisions.
Current status
All items above are proposed requirements, not completed implementation or certification. The Global Ring of Trust remains a concept pending independent governance and standards selection.