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SLeeLa Defender Integration
SLeeLa can provision the MEARVK administrative-defender source appropriate to the host OS. The SLVM-facing command for this capability is bin/OSsupport; the implementation-level interface remains sleela defender.
Supported sources
- Windows:
https://github.com/mearvk/Windows.Admin.Defender - Linux:
https://github.com/mearvk/Linux.Admin.Defender
The sleela defender command uses a fixed repository mapping; it does not accept an arbitrary download URL.
Commands
sleela defender detect
sleela defender fetch [directory] --allow-defender --sha256 <hex>
sleela defender build [directory] --allow-defender --sha256 <hex>
sleela defender install [directory] --allow-defender --sha256 <hex> --allow-root
sleela defender provision [directory] --allow-defender --sha256 <hex> --allow-root
provision performs fetch, build, and install in sequence.
Download and build directory
The optional [directory] argument can be either the download workspace
or the extracted backend source directory itself. It is never the SLeeLa
installation directory.
The driver downloads/extracts the selected backend to:
- Linux:
<directory>/Linux.Admin.Defender - Windows:
<directory>/Windows.Admin.Defender
If omitted, the workspace defaults to the system temporary directory under
sleela-defender (for example, /tmp/sleela-defender on Linux). If you pass the extracted backend directory itself, the driver recognizes it
and builds there; if you pass the workspace, it resolves the platform-specific
source subdirectory. The native build is invoked directly in the extracted backend tree: Linux runs
make -C <workspace>/Linux.Admin.Defender/kernel/file-locker; Windows invokes
<workspace>/Windows.Admin.Defender/build/build.ps1. The backend is not
supposed to be copied into SLeeLa's ~/.local/sleela directory.
Example using a persistent download workspace on Linux:
sleela defender fetch "$HOME/.cache/sleela-defender" --allow-defender --sha256 <archive-sha256>
sleela defender build "$HOME/.cache/sleela-defender" --allow-defender --sha256 <archive-sha256>
# Equivalent after fetch: pass the source directory itself
sleela defender build "$HOME/.cache/sleela-defender/Linux.Admin.Defender" --allow-defender --sha256 <archive-sha256>
The SLeeLa runtime's own integrity gate is separate from the backend download and build path. If that gate reports missing or mismatched SLeeLa files, repair the installed SLeeLa tree by rerunning the updated installer from the verified checkout; do not bypass the gate or copy arbitrary files over the installation.
Opt-in and integrity gates (required)
Because fetch/build/install/provision download a remote source tree and
can install a privileged (kernel) driver, they are disabled by default and
each guarded by an explicit gate. detect contacts nothing and needs no gate.
| Gate | Flag | Environment variable | Applies to |
|---|---|---|---|
| Opt in to network/build/install | --allow-defender | SLEELA_DEFENDER_OPTIN=1 | fetch, build, install, provision |
| Expected archive SHA-256 | --sha256 <hex> | SLEELA_DEFENDER_SHA256=<hex> | fetch, build, install, provision |
| Authorize privileged install | --allow-root | SLEELA_DEFENDER_ALLOW_ROOT=1 | install, provision |
Rules enforced by the compiler driver:
- Without
--allow-defender(or the env opt-in), any action other thandetectis refused before any network access. - The downloaded archive is hashed and compared against the value supplied via
--sha256/SLEELA_DEFENDER_SHA256. If the value is missing or does not match, the archive is deleted and the command fails closed. There is no trust-on-first-use. - The privileged install step (
sudo make installon Linux,pnputilon Windows) is never performed implicitly; it requires--allow-root(orSLEELA_DEFENDER_ALLOW_ROOT=1).
Example:
sleela defender provision \
--allow-defender \
--sha256 3f786850e387550fdab836ed7e6dc881de23001b... \
--allow-root
SLVM OSsupport command
From the repository bin/ directory, the user-facing command is:
OSsupport
OSsupport detect
OSsupport status
OSsupport fetch [directory]
OSsupport build [directory]
OSsupport install [directory]
OSsupport provision [directory]
OSsupport help
With no arguments, OSsupport presents numbered choices. With an argument, it is scriptable and preserves the exit status of the delegated sleela defender operation. See ../../OS_SUPPORT.md for the complete command and native-provisioning specification.
If executable permissions were not preserved after checkout, enable the command locally with:
chmod +x bin/OSsupport
Windows
The Windows path uses curl.exe or wget.exe to download the repository archive and then invokes the repository's build/build.ps1. The Windows project must contain a valid WDK Visual Studio project; the repository build script intentionally stops when that project is absent. Installation is performed only after a successful build and requires the appropriate administrative privileges and Windows driver-signing policy.
Linux
The Linux path uses curl or wget, extracts the repository archive, then runs the kernel module Makefile under kernel/file-locker/. Installation invokes make install, which requires root privileges and installs the built module through the normal kernel module installation path.
Result reporting
OSsupport reports an explicit terminal result and returns the underlying operation's exit status:
OSsupport result: SUCCESS (provision)
or:
OSsupport result: FAILED (build, exit <code>)
Native executable boundary
OSsupport is a shell command wrapper, not itself a Windows PE or Linux ELF executable. It locates the compiled sleela runtime at bin/sleela when present and otherwise falls back to impl/build/sleela. The native OS support build and installation are delegated to the platform-specific repositories.
Safety
This integration does not disable Secure Boot, Defender, UAC, driver signing, execution-policy protections, or other operating-system security controls. It downloads only the two fixed repositories above and leaves failures visible to the caller.
All network, build, and install actions are additionally disabled by default and require the explicit opt-in, payload-integrity, and privilege-authorization gates described under "Opt-in and integrity gates" above. Downloaded payloads are verified against a caller-supplied SHA-256 before use, and privilege elevation never happens implicitly.