SLeeLa SLeeLa # SLeeLa HTTP 3.0 **Status:** Internet-capable SLeeLa application-protocol server with integrity gate (keyed-MAC DIGEST, INTACTX tamper detection, NONCE replay guard, BASKET). **Platforms:** Linux · macOS · Windows 10+ HTTP 3.0 extends the SLeeLa HTTP 2.1 application model with a per-packet integrity substrate: keyed-MAC DIGEST (SipHash-2-4), INTACTX host-integrity fingerprinting, NONCE replay detection, and the fixed BASKET of goods & services. These additions sit between the parse and dispatch stages of the pipeline, forming an integrity gate that HTTP 2.1 deliberately omits. This is not a claim of IETF HTTP/3 semantics beyond the selected transport carrier (HTTP/3 + QUIC may provide the transport). ## Build and test ```sh make # build everything: selftest, kds, proto, station, server make server # build just the portable HTTP 3.0 server make server-test# run the server's built-in self-test make proto # build protocol-core objects only make demo # run the pipeline demo make test # run demo + station-test + Python flow tests make station # build station signaling make clean ``` ### Platform notes | Platform | Socket layer | Compiler | Link flags | |----------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|-------------------| | Linux | POSIX sockets via sleela_net| `cc` / `gcc` | (none) | | macOS | POSIX sockets via sleela_net| `cc` / `clang` | (none) | | Windows 10+ | Winsock2 via sleela_net | MSVC / MinGW | `-lws2_32` | The crypto substrate (`selftest`, `kds`) requires OpenSSL (detected via `pkg-config`). The protocol core, server, station, and pipeline demo do **not** require OpenSSL — they are pure C with libc only. ## Running the server ```sh ./http3_server --port 8082 ``` Options: - `--port N` — TCP listen port (default 8082) - `--self-test` — run the built-in test suite and exit - `--help` — show usage ## Architecture ```text Native transport endpoint (TCP, any platform) | HTTP/1.x request / connection ← sleela_net portable sockets | SLeeLa envelope / route ← X-SLeeLa-* headers or H3 envelope | HTTP/3 stream (logical) | SLeeLa logical PORT (160-bit) | SERVICE-ID / OP-ID / REQUEST-ID | ┌─────────────────── integrity gate ───────────────────┐ │ DIGEST verify (SipHash-2-4 keyed MAC) │ │ NONCE replay check (monotonic high-water mark) │ │ INTACTX tamper check (host-integrity threshold) │ │ BASKET canonical block verification │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ | Pipeline dispatch → handler → response ``` ## Core capabilities | Capability | Status | Notes | |---------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------| | Compact application envelope | Implemented | Textual + binary wire forms | | Fast service/operation naming | Implemented | Connection-local name→id dictionary | | Response model | Implemented | Transport ≠ application status | | Retry classification | Implemented | READ / IDEMPOTENT / MUTATING / STREAM | | Processing pipeline | Implemented | With integrity gate | | Request correlation | Implemented | REQUEST-ID echo | | **Keyed-MAC DIGEST** | Implemented | SipHash-2-4, 16-byte per-connection key | | **INTACTX host integrity** | Implemented | 64-bit fingerprint, tamper threshold + RESET| | **NONCE replay guard** | Implemented | Monotonic high-water mark | | **BASKET** | Implemented | Fixed goods & services block per packet | | 160-bit logical port | Implemented | 0 .. 10^48-1 namespace | | Carrier-certainty timing | Implemented | Max-speed, on-time, balance estimation | | Capability handshake | Implemented | L1–L4 negotiation levels | | Station signaling | Implemented | TCP-flag negotiation (userland + kernel) | ## Built-in endpoints | Path | Method | Description | |---------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------| | `/__sleela/health` | GET | Returns `SLeeLa HTTP/3.0 OK` | | `/__sleela/status` | GET | JSON: full pipeline status, integrity counters, carrier certainty | | `/__sleela/negotiate` | GET | Version negotiation result (JSON) | | `/__sleela/h3` | POST | H3 envelope endpoint — textual or binary, dispatched through the integrity gate + pipeline | ## SLeeLa application headers Every response includes: ``` X-SLeeLa-Version: 3.0 X-SLeeLa-Accept: 3.0, 2.1, 2.0, 1.1, 1.0 ``` ## Wire forms ```text Envelope (textual): H3 :\n Response (textual): H3R :\n Envelope (binary) : [ver:1][flags:1][svc_id:4][op_id:4][req_id:8][port:20] [nonce:8][digest:8][intactx:8][basket:N][payload_len:4][payload:N] ``` ## Integrity gate (3.0-era additions over 2.1) | Feature | Description | |--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------| | **DIGEST** | 64-bit SipHash-2-4 keyed MAC over header + basket + payload. Detects tampering. | | **NONCE** | Per-connection monotonic counter. Receiver rejects stale/replayed packets. | | **INTACTX** | 64-bit host-integrity fingerprint. Variance beyond threshold triggers RESET. | | **BASKET** | Fixed canonical block of goods & services, MAC-covered. | A packet whose DIGEST fails is rejected (BAD_DIGEST). A packet whose INTACTX variance exceeds the threshold is RESET (TAMPERED, never dispatched). A packet whose NONCE is not strictly greater than the high-water mark is rejected (REPLAYED). All three counters are exposed in the `/__sleela/status` endpoint. ## Security boundary Carrier security (TLS, QUIC) and SLeeLa application integrity are separate layers. Application integrity does not replace transport encryption or deployment authorization. Fallback must not silently weaken a required security property (HTTP.NEGOTIATION.md). ## Large-file download mode Files larger than 50 MB use the shared SLeeLa **DOWNLOAD** resume contract: ``` SESSION-ID | DATETIME | FILE-ID | FILE-NAME | INDEX | OFFSET | TOTAL-SIZE ``` ## Dependencies | Module | Path | Role | |-----------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------| | `sleela_net` | `impl/core/sleela_net.{c,h}` | Portable TCP sockets | | `preferred_router` | `preferred-routers/` | Routing-tier policy | | `resolver` | `resolver/` | DNS / path / event policy | | OpenSSL (optional) | system | Crypto substrate only | ## File inventory (server additions) | File | Description | |--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | `http3_server.h` | Server API, HTTP types, download state | | `http3_server.c` | Full server: parse, route, H3 envelope endpoint, self-test | | `http3_main.c` | CLI entry point with demo echo service + MAC key | | `http_negotiation.h` | C negotiation API (reformatted) | | `http_negotiation.c` | Version negotiation (reformatted) | | `http_negotiation.hpp` | C++ negotiation wrapper (reformatted) | | `http_negotiation.cpp` | C++ wrapper implementation (reformatted) | The existing protocol core (`http3_envelope`, `http3_naming`, `http3_pipeline`, `http3_mac`, `http3_intactx`, `http3_basket`, `http3_timing`, `http3_handshake`, `http3_profile`, `http3_port`), crypto substrate (`crypto_*`, `key_distribution_server`), station signaling, Python parity layer, and pipeline demo are unchanged. ## Unified route data This server consumes the SLeeLa unified route-data contract in `route/ROUTE.DATA.json` and `route/ROUTE.DATA.md`. VM identity: /impl Core, /1 Foundation, /2 Operator, /3 Specialist, /4 Supervisor, /5 Manager, /6 Director, /7 Administrator, /8 Executive, /9 Authority, /10 Principal, /11 Sovereign. --- # SLeeLa

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