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<!-- preonem: this document is an enacted artifact of the advantage legislature, graded unto time and space. See PREONEM.md. -->
Advantage Trade Mathematics — a Math subject
Bilateral trade economics for the
advantagepackage. Treat a buyer and a seller as one coordinated system: first maximize the total surplus, then decide how to split it, with an extra model for perishable/stochastic demand.Implemented as SLeeLa subject classes under
lib/advantage/math/and validated end-to-end bymath/trade-math-demo.sleela.
| Subject | Class | Scenario |
|---|---|---|
| Joint Profit Maximization | SLJointProfitMax | Fixed demand — lock in maximum efficiency (Q*) |
| Nash Bargaining | SLNashBargaining | Variable pricing — negotiate contract terms from a known surplus |
| Bilateral Newsvendor | SLBilateralNewsvendor | Perishable / seasonal — avoid stockouts or excess holding waste |
| Shared math helpers | SLTradeMath | expD, lnD, powAB, sqrtD (no cross-package imports) |
Throughout, the buyer-revenue and seller-cost curves are modelled as quadratics, so every optimum and split is a closed form and exactly checkable:
R_B(Q) = rbA·Q − rbB·Q² buyer revenue / utility (concave)
C_S(Q) = csA·Q + csB·Q² seller cost (convex)
The worked example used in every section below fixes
R_B(Q) = 100Q − Q² and C_S(Q) = 20Q + Q².
1. Joint Profit Maximization — the Integrated Surplus Formula
When costs are known on both ends, treat buyer and seller as a single coordinated system and maximize the total economic surplus before dividing it.
Definition.
Π_total(Q) = R_B(Q) − C_S(Q)
Q— inventory / order quantity.R_B(Q)— the buyer's revenue (or utility valuation) fromQunits.C_S(Q)— the seller's total cost to produce/supplyQunits.Π_total(Q)— the total available pool of profit.
Decision rule. The optimal volume Q* is where marginal revenue equals
marginal supply cost:
dR_B/dQ = dC_S/dQ
For the quadratic curves this is linear in Q:
rbA − 2·rbB·Q = csA + 2·csB·Q
⇒ Q* = (rbA − csA) / (2·(rbB + csB))
Sketch — the surplus is a cap; its peak sits at Q*:
Π_total(Q)
│ ___
│ ,-' `-.
│ ,' `.
│ ,' peak = `.
│ / Π_total(Q*) \
│ / | \
│ / | \
└─────────── Q* ───────────── Q
0
MR > MC → | ← MR < MC
(expand) (contract)
To the left of Q*, each extra unit earns more than it costs (MR > MC) — keep
expanding. To the right, each extra unit costs more than it earns — pull back.
The peak is the most total value the relationship can create.
Example (R_B = 100Q − Q², C_S = 20Q + Q²):
Q* = (100 − 20) / (2·(1 + 1)) = 80 / 4 = 20
Π_total(20) = (100·20 − 20²) − (20·20 + 20²)
= (2000 − 400) − (400 + 400)
= 1600 − 800 = 800
MR(20) = 100 − 2·20 = 60 MC(20) = 20 + 2·20 = 60 ✓ equal
SLJointProfitMax jpm = new SLJointProfitMax();
jpm.configureCurves(100.0, 1.0, 20.0, 1.0);
double qstar = jpm.optimalQuantity(); // 20
double pool = jpm.maxJointProfit(); // 800
2. Bilateral Monopoly & the Nash Bargaining Game
Once the optimal total profit is fixed at Q*, how it is split depends on
the wholesale price P. The individual profit curves are:
Seller: Π_S(P, Q) = P·Q − C_S(Q)
Buyer: Π_B(P, Q) = R_B(Q) − P·Q
At a fixed Q*, raising P moves value from buyer to seller one-for-one — it
does not change the size of the pool, only who holds it.
Definition — the Nash Bargaining Solution picks the price that maximizes the geometric product of each party's surplus over its disagreement (fallback) point:
max_P [Π_S(P,Q*) − Π_S⁰]^α · [Π_B(P,Q*) − Π_B⁰]^(1−α)
Π_S⁰, Π_B⁰— reservation profits (what each makes if the deal falls through: alternative vendors, scrap value, etc.).α— bargaining-power index in[0,1]. Atα = 0.5with symmetric reservations, the surplus splits exactly down the middle.
Closed form. Because the pool is fixed at Q*, the generalized Nash
solution awards the seller a fraction α of the bargainable surplus
S = Π_total(Q*) − Π_S⁰ − Π_B⁰:
Π_S(P*) − Π_S⁰ = α·S
P* = ( Π_S⁰ + α·S + C_S(Q*) ) / Q*
Sketch — sliding the split along the fixed pool:
value
│ Π_S (rises with P) Π_B (falls with P)
│ \ /
│ \ P* /
│ \ │ /
│ \ ▼ /
│ Π_S⁰ ··\···············/···· Π_B⁰
│ \ α : 1−α /
└───────────┴───────────┴──────────── P
disagreement the split that maximizes the Nash product
The whole bar between Π_S⁰ and Π_B⁰ is the surplus S; α chooses where
along it the deal lands.
Example (Q* = 20, Π_total = 800, reservations 0/0):
α = 0.5: S = 800, seller share = 400
P* = (0 + 400 + C_S(20)) / 20 = (400 + 800) / 20 = 60
Π_S = 60·20 − 800 = 400 Π_B = 1600 − 1200 = 400 (even split)
α = 0.75: seller share = 600
P* = (600 + 800) / 20 = 70
Π_S = 70·20 − 800 = 600 Π_B = 1600 − 1400 = 200
SLNashBargaining nash = new SLNashBargaining();
nash.configure(jpm);
double p = nash.nashPrice(0.0, 0.0, 0.5); // 60 (400 / 400)
double pPow = nash.nashPrice(0.0, 0.0, 0.75); // 70 (600 / 200)
double obj = nash.nashObjective(p, qstar, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5);
3. Bilateral Newsvendor — Perishable / Stochastic Demand
If the inventory faces uncertain end-market demand but both parties' holding and shortage costs are transparent, the profit curves are governed by overage (one unit too many) and underage (one unit too few) costs on each side.
| Metric | Seller | Buyer |
|---|---|---|
Overage c_o | c_o,S = cs − vs (prod. cost − seller salvage) | c_o,B = P − vb (wholesale − buyer salvage) |
Underage c_u | c_u,S = P − cs (wholesale − prod. cost) | c_u,B = r − P (retail − wholesale) |
where r = retail price, cs = unit production cost, P = wholesale price,
vs = seller salvage, vb = buyer salvage.
Definition — the Centralized Critical Ratio. To prevent double
marginalization (both parties hedging separately and restricting inventory too
much), the system-wide optimum is the service level F(Q*):
F(Q*) = c_u,system / (c_u,system + c_o,system)
= (r − cs) / ((r − cs) + (cs − vb))
System underage r − cs is the full channel margin lost on a stockout; system
overage cs − vb is the production cost unrecovered beyond buyer salvage.
Sketch — the critical ratio is the point on the demand CDF to stock to:
F(Q)
1 ┤ ________________
│ _,-''
│ _,-''
F* ┤----------●'' F* = (r−cs)/((r−cs)+(cs−vb))
│ ,'|
│ ,' | stock Q* so P(demand ≤ Q*) = F*
│ ,' |
0 ┤_,-' |
└──────────┴─────────────────────────────── Q
0 Q*
Stock up to the quantity whose probability of covering demand equals F*.
A higher margin (r − cs) pushes F* toward 1 (stock more); a higher overage
cost pushes it toward 0 (stock less).
Coordination. A standalone buyer faces only its own ratio
F_B = (r − P)/((r − P)+(P − vb)), which sits below F(Q*) — that
shortfall is double marginalization. A buyback or revenue-sharing
contract lifts F_B up to the centralized F(Q*), so the buyer is
financially incentivized to order exactly Q*.
Example (r = 100, cs = 20, vb = 5, P = 60):
system underage = 100 − 20 = 80
system overage = 20 − 5 = 15
F(Q*) = 80 / (80 + 15) = 80 / 95 ≈ 0.8421
buyer-only: c_u,B = 100 − 60 = 40, c_o,B = 60 − 5 = 55
F_B = 40 / 95 ≈ 0.4211
coordination gap = 0.8421 − 0.4211 ≈ 0.4211 (a contract is needed)
SLBilateralNewsvendor nv = new SLBilateralNewsvendor();
double f = nv.criticalRatio(100.0, 20.0, 5.0); // 0.8421
double gap = nv.coordinationGap(100.0, 20.0, 60.0, 5.0); // 0.4211
4. The Profit Split, Visually
The pieces compose into distinct profit zones. The pool is fixed by Model 1; Model 2 slides the boundary between the parties; Model 3 keeps the pool from shrinking under uncertainty.
Π_total(Q*) = 800 (Model 1: the fixed pool)
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ seller surplus │ buyer surplus │
│ Π_S − Π_S⁰ │ Π_B − Π_B⁰ │
│◄──────── α ────────────────►│◄──────── 1 − α ─────────────►│ (Model 2)
│ P* = 60 │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
α = 0.5 → 400 / 400 α = 0.75 → 600 / 200
Without coordination the buyer would order at F_B ≈ 0.42 instead of
F* ≈ 0.84, shrinking the whole bar. A buyback / revenue-share contract
restores it to the full 800. (Model 3)
Summary of tactical next steps
| Scenario | Objective | Model to use |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed demand | Lock in maximum efficiency | Joint Profit Maximization (Q*) — SLJointProfitMax |
| Variable pricing | Negotiate terms out of a known surplus | Nash Bargaining — SLNashBargaining |
| Perishable / seasonal | Avoid stockouts or excess holding waste | Bilateral Newsvendor critical ratio — SLBilateralNewsvendor |
Run the subject
./working-binaries/sleela run lib/advantage/math/trade-math-demo.sleela
run auto-links the sibling subject classes in lib/advantage/math/. The demo
prints each model and validates every result against the anchors above
(Q* = 20, Π_total = 800, Nash P* = 60 splitting 400/400, α = 0.75 →
600/200, critical ratio 80/95 ≈ 0.8421) — ending in ALL CHECKS PASSED.
Notes and honest limits
- Every class carries the mandatory Metadata Class metapattern
(
.kiro/steering/metadata-class-standard.md). The economic results are cited to their real sources — Cournot (1838) forMR = MC, Nash (1950) for the bargaining solution, Arrow–Harris–Marschak (1951) for the newsvendor ratio — so nometaNationalScheduleis invented. - The newsvendor critical ratio gives the optimal service level
F(Q*), not a unit quantity directly; convertingF(Q*)into an order size needs the demand distribution's inverse CDF, which is out of scope here. - The quadratic curve forms are a modelling choice that makes
Q*,P*, and the splits closed-form and exactly testable; a real engagement would fit the curves (or sample the marginals) from measured revenue and cost data.